


NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, R. I.

**STAFFING THE JOINT TASK FORCE,
AN OPPORTUNITY FOR TEAM BUILDING**

by

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
A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature: Bradley E. Johanson

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ABSTRACT

STAFFING THE JOINT TASK FORCE, AN OPPORTUNITY FOR TEAM BUILDING.

by Commander Bradley E. Johanson, USN, 20 pages.

This paper compares and contrasts three concepts for staffing Joint Task Force (JTF) command elements:

(1) The creation of Standing JTF staffs trained by U.S. Atlantic Command (USACOM) and provisioned with the standard communications and automation packages required to work in any of the regional Unified Command areas.

(2) Designation of the Theater Service Component Commanders as the Commanders of Joint Task Forces (CJTF's) established in their operating areas and the use of elements of their Component staff as the nucleus of the JTF. This concept includes augmentation by personnel from the other Service components, from the Theater Commander-in-Chiefs (CINC's) staff and augmentation teams from the Joint Staff for communications and intelligence.

(3) The use of an element of the Unified Commanders staff (e.g. The J-3, J-4 or J-5) as the JTF, with augmentation from the Theater Component staffs and the Joint Staff as delineated above.

In comparing these concepts, several distinctions arise which offer a means for differentiating their potential suitability. These distinctions include the staffs sensitivity to regional opportunities and limitations, the potential for forming a joint service team capable of molding a plan which will provide synergistic joint capabilities and the capacity of the organization to reach a level of maturity that allows the principles of unity of command, economy of force, mass and simplicity to be preserved.

The conclusions reached cite fatal flaws in each of the three concepts studied and recommends instead, a composite plan, combining the upper tier command structure of the Theater Component Command option with the staff nucleus provided by a standing JTF team. The composite team thus formed will reap the benefits of regional expertise, continuity and staff cohesion required to support the complex, and sometimes long term JTF missions in place today.

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In 1778, the Rhode Island component of the Continental Army, under the command of General Sullivan, prepared to conduct a two phase amphibious operation in conjunction with the French fleet, commanded by ADM D'Estang. The operation was designed to displace the British forces occupying Aquidneck Island from Newport to Portsmouth. While pre-engagement planning provided a scheme for synchronizing combined arms and employed a two axis assault on the fortifications surrounding Newport harbor, the operation ended in disaster, as a failure to provide unity of command resulted in haggling over the timing of the operation, allowed the reinforcement of the British forces by fleet assets and led to sequential (vice concurrent) engagements by the allied forces. While common purpose existed for the operation, the fragmented command structure adopted resulted in a loss of unity of effort and defeat. With this operation, the history of Joint/Combined Task Force operations by the United States began and the ensuing record of results has highlighted some of our greatest triumphs, as well as our most embarrassing defeats. From the Revolutionary War to the Battle of Vicksburg, and from Desert One to Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti, the United States has a long and engaging history of Joint and Combined operations.

The purpose of this paper is to explore the issue of staffing the Joint Task Force (JTF) Headquarters in order to determine the optimum mix of staff representation, thereby insuring that the scheme for employment adopted truly represents the optimum balance of Joint Force capabilities. Recent JTF operations and Theater Commanders plans for staffing Joint Task Force command elements illustrate a wide range of concepts, from ad hoc committees assembled by the Joint Staff (e.g. Desert One) to the designation of Theater Component Commanders and their assigned staffs as the core element of JTF's. For the purposes of this study, three concepts for JTF staffing will be explored:¹

(1) The creation of Standing Joint Task Force staffs, based in the Continental United States (CONUS), trained by U.S. Atlantic Command (USACOM) and provisioned with the standard communications and automation packages required to work in any of the regional Unified Command areas.

(2) Designation of the Theater Service Component Commanders as the Commanders of Joint Task Forces (CJTF's) established in their operating areas and the use of elements of their Component staff as the nucleus of the JTF. This concept includes augmentation by personnel from the other Service components, from the Theater Commander-in-Chiefs (CINC's) staff and augmentation teams from the Joint Staff for communications and intelligence. These teams would be trained by the Theater Commander.

(3) The use of an element of the Unified Commanders staff (e.g. The J-3, J-4 or J-5) as the JTF, with augmentation from the regional components and the Joint Staff as delineated above.

While not a complete listing of the concepts advanced for creating a JTF staff present in current literature, these three concepts capture the issues most critical to effective staff organization and represent the spectrum of options considered to be most feasible, given the current regional focus for Unified Command organization and the resource constraints likely to be encountered for the next 10-15 years. Note that one concept: ad hoc staffing, will not be discussed, as it fails to meet any of the organizational principles necessary to form an effective command element. This does not imply, however, that a significant percentage of our current staffing process does not rely on ad hoc procedures for identifying staff members. It simply reflects the authors opinion that ad hoc staffing is inconsistent with the standards for staff efficiency, continuity and team building necessary to successfully accomplish the JTF mission.

In the ensuing pages a review of each of the three staff construction concepts delineated above will be conducted, delineating each concepts strengths and limitations in providing for effective staff organization in support of successful completion of the JTF mission. But before we launch into a discussion of the specific concepts, it may be useful to delineate the responsibilities of the JTF Commander and his staff. Joint Pub 0-2 indicates that while the specific duties of the Commander will vary with the mission assigned, the following general responsibilities will be relevant across the range of missions encountered:²

(1) To provide timely communication of clear-cut missions or tasks to subordinates, together with the role of each subordinate in the superior's plan.

(2) To assign and apportion forces among subordinates in a timely manner to allow requisite planning, preparation and completion of the assigned mission.

(3) To provide all available information to subordinates that bears on the mission and the changing situation.

(4) To delegate authority to subordinates commensurate with their responsibilities.

In short, what is required is the creation of an environment which adheres to the principles of war: a clear statement of the Objective, Unity of Command, Economy of Effort, Mass and Simplicity, as well as providing for decentralized execution and freedom of action.³

Concept (1): Standing JTF staffs. Advocates of the Standing JTF concept cite superior staff cohesion, training and organizational continuity as the concepts primary strengths. This method of JTF staff formulation includes the creation of a permanent staff element, subordinate either to the JCS or ACOM staffs, that would exist with the sole purpose of training for JTF operations and would stand ready to deploy at short notice in response to Contingency tasking. Since the staff would be CONUS based, it is likely that a portion of the staff would be allowed to participate in the early stages of review of Operational Plans developed or Crisis Action Planning. Consequently, the JTF's mission, assigned as a result of the Course Of Action (COA) development process would be familiar to the JTF Commander and a portion of his staff. With this insight into the issues involving the specific COA selected, the Commander and staff will have an advantage in designing employment plans which specifically fill the mission requirements, while remaining sensitive to the issues which led to the rejection of other COA's.

The selection of a Commander for the standing JTF will allow the choice of a military officer with broad joint experience, yet it is unlikely that he would have the regional expertise that would be provided by a Theater Component Commander or member of the CINC's staff. In most regional contingencies, the Commander chosen needs to have exceptional insight into regional sensitivities, including a detailed understanding of alliances, basing, host nation support and in-theater logistics. Without these qualities, even the most diplomatic Commander may be ineffective in forming the relationships with the host nation and regional allies necessary to successfully accomplish the mission. Further, the use of a senior officer

external to the theater may fail to inspire the trust and confidence of the Unified Commander, resulting in a reluctance to rely on a JTF organizational option (instead retaining central control of the operation at the Theater level) or a delay in assigning forces to the JTF, thereby undermining the JTF's ability to conduct the integrated planning necessary to facilitate coordination of his forces.. **Above all else it is essential that the CJTF have the confidence of the CINC.** Without the CINC's confidence it is unlikely that the CJTF will enjoy the freedom of action necessary to task organize the forces assigned or to enjoy the operational control necessary to implement Unity of Command. There are numerous examples, both recent and historic, that illustrate the fate of Joint or Combined Force missions that lacked unity of command. For U.S. operations, one need look no further back than Operation Continue Hope to see the disorder caused by independently assigning forces operating in the same country to a subunified command (COMUSFORSOM), Component Commands operating independently (TF Ranger, NAVCENT) and a JTF. The results were disorder, confusion and a nearly complete lack of unity of effort among the various staffs. In the Continue Hope case study, even coordination of air operations suffered from a refusal to designate a common functional authority to develop an effective airspace deconfliction scheme. Not only did we fail to achieve unity of effort in this operation, we degraded the ability of each independent service to operate effectively in the constrained battle space by failing to provide a workable scheme for coordination.

A further disadvantage of using the standing JTF concept would be the potential mismatch of the Commanders field of operational expertise with the expertise required for the mission. In determining the relative importance of this factor, consideration must be given to the role envisioned for Functional Component Commanders. In accordance with Joint Pub 5-00.2: "A JTF commander has full authority to organize all elements of assigned and attached forces as necessary to accomplish assigned missions." This includes the use of subordinate commanders, both Service Component Commanders and Functional Component Commanders.⁴ Given the constrained geography, basing and smaller force structure available to the JTF (by comparison with the CINC), plus the fact that by definition a Joint Task Force is established to pursue objectives that require the use of two or more services, functional components offer optimal

coordination and the potential synergistic effects most attractive in pursuing joint objectives. If functional components are used to pursue the Commanders intent, then the necessity for having a CJTF with extensive operational experience in the primary mission area will be of less concern than ensuring that the CJTF is someone who enjoys the CINC's trust and confidence and has a strong understanding of regional security and diplomatic issues.

Many of the same issues that are crucial in selecting a Commander are paralleled in selecting members of the JTF staff. Staff members must be conversant with regional issues, they must enjoy the Commanders trust and confidence and must offer technical expertise in relevant warfare specialties. In addition, the staff must be able to provide a level of organizational maturity that provides rapid, concise assessments of the operating environment, effective and efficient guidance to subordinate commands and cohesive plans which reflect the full spectrum of joint capabilities available. It is in this regard that the standing JTF concept is superior to all others.⁵ With closely controlled selection, the JTF commander can assemble a staff that represents each major warfare community. The team that is then tasked to form the nucleus for a given JTF mission can enjoy appropriate representation from all communities deemed necessary. Since this team is entirely PCS to the standing JTF command, the personnel will have worked together daily with the central focus of their efforts being preparations for exercising the staff in support of contingency tasking. Through a full time devotion to team building, exercise support, joint planning, liaison with the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Crisis Action Planning personnel (J-3 division) and development of common staff philosophy and methodology, the team thus formed will be able to organize rapidly to meet the Commanders needs and to accurately convey his intent to assigned forces.⁶ The two key advantages to this approach include the provision for personnel that are permanently assigned (vice TDY) and the fact that they are focused on JTF support, not dual hatted with competing administrative duties unrelated to the JTF mission. Neither of the other staff concepts enjoy these advantages.

To what extent then is the organizational maturity of the staff critical to the completion of the mission? The clarity of focus of the standing staff will provide a joint perspective offering a balanced blend of the capabilities of each of the services and will maximize the synergistic effects of the joint force,

as well as providing economy of effort. The familiarity of the staff officers and common methodology developed during team building events will produce a level of efficiency which will optimize the clarity of instructions passed to subordinate forces thereby providing a clear-cut statement of mission objectives, subordinate tasks and coordinating instructions. Further, the permanent nature of the standing JTF will provide this joint expertise and clearly defined staff organization early in the process of mission planning, providing first cut plans which appropriately represent the capabilities of all the services.⁷

What the standing staff can not provide is regionally tailored instructions. Since they will not have worked as often with the regional CINC's staff as the component forces, the standing JTF will rely on joint doctrine and standard operating procedures. On one hand this will be an advantage to subordinate forces whose predeployment training will have stressed joint standards. But on the other hand, many of the differences between standardized procedures and regionally tailored procedures stem from theater specific relationships with allies, host nations or geographic constraints which are not adequately addressed by joint procedures. Consequently, the JTF will either be required to adapt to accommodate the new procedures or the CINC staff will have to exempt the JTF's operating area from the procedures imposed. As an example of the potential impact of this problem on operations, if a standing staff were deployed to support an operation such as Provide Promise or Abel Sentry (U.S. operations associated with the Bosnian conflict), the JTF would have to adapt its means for coordination and communication with assigned forces and the Theater Commander to fill NATO requirements, as NATO and Western European Union assets are simultaneously supporting missions in the same operating area. In this scenario, each JTF task impacts not only U.S. forces, but also the allies. Consequently, even though these two operations are uniquely U.S., European Command (EUCOM) is better served by appointing a Component Commander (in this case CINCUSNAVEUR/CINCSOUTH) as CJTF over these operations, as well as U.S. participation in Deny Flight and Sharp Guard.⁸ By appointing a Component Commander dual hatted as a NATO Commander, unity of command and unity of effort can be preserved with minimal degradation to the established command structure. While the example cited constitutes a particularly difficult scenario due to the overlapping coverage of command elements from several organizations (i.e. NATO, U.N.,

WEU, U.S.), regional Component Commanders will almost always enjoy a substantial advantage over their standing JTF counterpart in exercising command within a coalition force, due to the perceived legitimacy of their regional authority. Thus, the standing JTF concept is disadvantaged in light of the U.S. trend towards increasing reliance on regional coalitions.

The final issue which differentiates the standing JTF staff concept from the others being considered involves staff training. In 1993, revisions to the Unified Command Plan assigned responsibilities as the CONUS joint force integrator to CINC USACOM. While this assignment has not significantly shifted the burden of responsibility for joint force employment away from the regional Combatant Commands, the funding available for training has provided ACOM with a significant advantage in supporting JTF training and the development of standard command post equipment and procedures. With this specific purpose in mind, the Joint Training, Analysis and Simulation Center (JTASC) has been established in Suffolk, Virginia.⁸ This facility has become the center for JTF staff instruction, simulation based exercises and mission rehearsal. Since this facility is uniquely available in CONUS, and is located in the Tidewater area, such that availability is optimized for local staffs, a standing JTF staff assigned to ACOM or JCS would be able to operate at the heart of JTF operational and strategic thought. As U.S. force capabilities continue to stress high tech solutions to our force integration, command and control issues, this provision for exercising at a facility which features the very latest Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Information and Intelligence (C4I2) equipment will be crucial to rapid deployment, headquarters setup and initiation of fully integrated operations within the theater. No other staff construction concept shares this advantage.

In summary, the standing JTF staff concept offers unmatched advantages in the areas of organizational maturity, joint planning support, rapid deployment and familiarity with JTF associated C4I2 equipment. Each of these advantages offers the potential for creating an operating environment which sustains unity of command, economy of effort and synergistic joint force employment. Conversely, in comparison with the other concepts of staff construction, the standing JTF suffers from a lack of regional focus. In each of the JTF employment scenarios in place today, regional issues regarding host

nation diplomatic relations, basing, theater logistical concerns and coalition politics constitute major influences in determining the ultimate achievement of the strategic goals for the operation. In these scenarios, the standing JTF staff will be ill equipped to deal with the sensitive issues associated with regional relations and are likely to encounter more constraints regarding freedom of action than the other staff construct options considered, thereby limiting the methods available to link military gains to political victory.

Concept (2) Theater Component Commands as JTF's.

The second concept for building a JTF staff entails the designation of the Theater Service Component Commander with the preponderance of force committed to the mission as Commander of the Joint Task Force. The JTF staff is then composed of a nucleus from the Commanders Service Component staff, with augmentation from the CINC's staff, the other Service Components and the Joint staff. The goal of this concept is to provide the lead service with the freedom of action associated with a joint command structure, while providing the CINC with a regionally tailored, mission oriented subordinate staff supported by standard intelligence and communications packages (provided by JCS).

Before initiating a review of the relative advantages and disadvantages of this staff concept, it seems appropriate to discuss the requirement for a three star officer to lead the JTF mission. Why a Component Commander and not the on scene Commander with the preponderance of force (such as a Battle Group Commander, Composite Wing Commander or Division staff)? After all, officers of lesser rank are probably more available and quite likely have all the skills necessary to create an operating environment in which the military objectives can be met. In answer to this question, I would maintain that it is in the political arena, not the military one that the CJTF will often have his greatest impact. When interacting with the senior political or military leaders of the host nation, the Component Commanders rank, regional influence and relatively long term presence will provide a perception of enhanced authority when representing the U.S. in bilateral negotiations. Further, in coordinating with regional allies, the Component Commanders visibility as a primary U.S. representative in on-going regional affairs imparts a clear perception that the United States is pursuing its policy with emphasis and that there is a clear link

between our regional security policy and the JTF's mission. In many cases this emphasis may be just the deterrent necessary to prevent mission creep. Finally, a three star position provides the CJTF with rank clearly superior to the Commanders of the forces assigned as subordinates. Whether the forces assigned include Carrier Battle groups, Composite Air Wings or Army Divisions, it is unlikely that subordinate organizations will be led by an officer of superior rank. As the CJTF molds the organizational structure of the forces assigned, whether it be as functional components or as separate services operating in coordination, his clear superiority in both rank and positional authority are likely to provide smooth inter-service relations and unchallenged organizational initiatives.

Given the appropriate use of a flag officer of three star rank, the greatest advantage then in using a Theater Component Command as the nucleus for a JTF staff is the regional expertise provided. Most likely, the Component Commander will have participated in regional security operations and will be sensitive to the limitations posed by regional alliances, basing restrictions, host nation relations and logistical constraints. In addition, he will undoubtedly have the CINC's trust and confidence, a confidence built upon recent close association within the theater of operations and based on the Component Commanders expertise in the mission area of primary importance in pursuing the JTF mission (a logical extension of his representing the service with the preponderance of force). This trust will provide the Component Commander with substantial freedom of action and confidence in organizing assigned forces, as well as in requesting early liaison with prospective forces to facilitate operational planning. As such, this concept for creating a JTF staff will provide favorable organization of forces and a regionally tailored response to complete the mission objectives.

Conversely, reliance on a Component Commander will deny the CINC a truly "joint" operation. Once the COA selection process is complete (a process the Component Commander will be unlikely to have extensively participated in), the newly designated CJTF will begin to oversee the development of employment plans by the core of his staff. It is unlikely that augmentees from the other Service components will be available at this early date, consequently, the initial plans drafted will feature a disproportionately large role by the lead service.⁹ While provisions for augmentees from the other service

components may lead to the development of a truly joint staff latter in the operation, the lack of representation during the initial planning will serve to impede staff integration as augmentees feel the need to aggressively advocate alternative concepts to increase the role of their respective services in the final plans adopted. The competitive environment built by this organizational deficiency will undermine the staffs ability to clearly communicate the Commanders intent to their respective services or to build the common staff philosophy necessary to insure the Commanders concept is pursued with economy of force.

As the JTF staff is assembled, the CINC's blueprint for JTF staffing within the theater will play a major role in forging a team with the appropriate joint flavor. Current theater plans for each regional CINC provide a billet list for Theater, Component and Joint staff personnel who will be assigned to the JTF when established. For example, CINCPAC has published his guidance in a concept referred to as the Deployable Joint Task Force Augmentation Cell (DJTFAC).¹⁰ When a JTF is required in the PACOM area of responsibility, CINCPAC will designate either the 7th Fleet Commander, III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) Commander or I Corps Commander as the CJTF, depending on the scenario involved. These Component Commanders are tasked to form the JTF staff from a nucleus of their own service staff personnel plus the DJTFAC. The Deployable JTF Augmentation Cell includes 20-24 personnel extracted from the following established team: 15 from the CINC's staff, 5 each from the Service Component staffs (PACAF, PACFLT, ARPAC, FMFPAC) and 1 each from JICPAC and SOCPAC. In addition, a Deputy JTF Commander is provided by one of the services other than the lead service and a Joint Communications Support Element (JCSE)¹¹ and National Intelligence Support Team (NIST)¹² are provided by the Joint staff.

The advantage of using a pre-established augmentation group is that they can respond quickly when activated, may have benefited from team building exercises in conjunction with semi-annual JTF exercises and will often be familiar with their staff counterparts from the other services as they work operational training issues. Unfortunately, this staff concept relies on dual hatted personnel as augmentees. Consequently, when the JTF is training, there will be extensive competition for the time of the team members in order to cover their full time administrative duties. When operational, the JTF will

remove these personnel from their parent commands and create an administrative burden which will beg their early recall if the mission of the JTF becomes protracted.

During Operation Just Cause, the CJTF, LtGen Stiner, indicated that the requirement to simultaneously support both routine Service Component staff duties and JTF responsibilities nearly overwhelmed his staff and could not have been sustained beyond the short term duration of the operation.¹³ For this reason, several of the CINC's have limited the portion of the JTF staff extracted from the lead services staff to 50% and will transition to personnel rotations from CONUS based units if the JTF operation becomes protracted. Unfortunately, this policy leads to one of the greatest detractors from organizational effectiveness during a long term mission: the turnover of short term augmentees. The JTF's established for both Southwest Asia (JTF SWA) in conjunction with Operation Southern Watch and Bosnia in conjunction with Deny Flight, Sharp Guard, Provide Promise and Able Sentry severely suffer with regard to organizational continuity and consistency due to the 90 and 180 day turnover of the majority of staff personnel assigned. In each of these operations, regional and coalition relationships are vital to the success of the JTF's mission¹⁴, yet we continue to rely on short term personnel with very little regional expertise to coordinate these very delicate and complicated operations.

If the primary mission of the United States Military Services is war fighting, then why do we put the lowest priority on the organizational integrity of our front line JTF staffs? These organizations should reap the benefit of our most talented joint officers. Officers who are intimately familiar with the regional command relationships, joint/combined force capabilities and hand picked to form the cohesive staff required to provide subordinate forces with a clear, concise statement of objectives. This inability to support long term JTF missions is a key weakness of the Component Commander staff construction concept.

Given the Component Command concepts reliance on augmentation personnel, a study of the importance of organizational integrity for each component of the staff is warranted. In some cases, specialized skills or equipment will be found to be more critical to the staff's contribution to the mission

than organizational maturity, while in other cases, team integration will be found to be the key factor in underwriting success.

In analyzing the organizational efficiency of military staffs, in general it is the areas which are most dependent on technology that are easiest to standardize and therefore the least reliant on personal interaction. Consequently, the Intelligence (J-2) and Communications (J-6) departments may be able to provide technical services fairly early in the process of organizational development, while the Operations (J-3), Plans (J-5) and Logistics (J-4) departments will be able to provide first class products only after maturing as a team. This is not to imply that organizational maturity is not a primary goal in the J-2 or J-6 shops. On the contrary, they are critical attributes of these organizations as well. It's just that these departments are generally better able to integrate information and resources in a shorter period due to their focus on technology, standardized procedures and automation.

What is it then that allows a personnel intensive organization to produce it's best work? The answer lies in dependence on a common philosophy for task organization, a free flow of information to the decision nodes that are most critical, the ability to freely express ideas during the brainstorming process when drafting initial plans and the ability to predict what information the Commander will need and what course of action he is most likely to select when making the key decisions. This certainly is not intended to be an exhaustive list of the features of a mature staff. But these features will provide the optimum plan in the least amount of time. They will also allow the watchstander to provide appropriate guidance to the subordinate forces as they develop their tactical plans under a common philosophy of centralized control and decentralized execution.¹⁵ It is also these features which will allow the logistician to provide a depth of supply appropriate for the tempo of operations the Commander will establish.

Unfortunately, the single item which can provide this capability is the one lacking in the concepts which rely on augmentation: training time and routine interaction. In an effort to mitigate the problems associated with the lack of JTF training opportunities, EUCOM has hosted an annual JTF training symposium for the past several years.¹⁶ Other theater staffs have also conducted JTF training aside from the joint exercises, however, the most common means of keeping JTF staffs current is to assign

augmentation personnel to several JTF teams. As such, a given Theater Component staff officer may be assigned as part of the staff nucleus for scenarios in which his or her Component Commander is assigned as the standby JTF, while also being assigned as an augmentee to one of the other Component Commanders contingency JTF staffs. This dual assignment is effective in keeping the staff officer adequately trained, as they will now participate in two or three JTF exercises during the two year exercise schedule. However, should the two JTF staffs be required simultaneously, the second JTF established will end up being augmented by a completely untrained fill in. Given the widespread use of this practice, a second JTF staff established in a single theater may rely on a majority of personnel with little to no joint experience.

A second abuse of this JTF staffing concept involves the role played by Liaison officers (LNO's). Past operations have highlighted the outstanding role played by liaison personnel provided by the warfighting forces to coordinate their participation in joint operations. The advantage gained allows the staff to reap the benefits of the tactical expertise of the operators, while providing the Air Wing, Battalion or Battle Group with a representative who can provide specific information regarding the Commanders intentions in a format specifically tailored to their needs. Unfortunately, our tendency is to rely on these LNO's as augmentees to the planning groups, rather than providing longer term operational planners who are well versed in Operational Art. Consequently, when the LNO's two to three week assignment expires and they are replaced with other short term personnel, the continuity of the plans and progress made in forming a cohesive, balanced planning team are sacrificed. LNO's have a very specific short term purpose. Our penchant for relying on them as integral team members is not well served.

In summarizing the advantages and disadvantages of the Component Command option for JTF staff formulation, this concept provides a command element with the regional expertise necessary to accommodate host nation and allied concerns. It also provides the CINC with a subordinate Commander who he is comfortable with. Conversely, this concept is the least sustainable due to the administrative burden placed on a Component staff attempting to simultaneously support their normal peacetime mission and the JTF. The temptation to replace JTF staff officers who are dual hatted with Component Command

duties will lead to excessive staff rotations and reliance on augmentees outside the theater of operation, thereby undermining organizational continuity and the regional focus desired. When coupled with the narrow single service focus of a Service Component Command, the JTF Commander will find it difficult to build the cohesive team with a joint perspective necessary to provide joint asset synergy on the battle field. While JTF training opportunities, including Joint Training exercises will improve the performance of the staff created using this concept, the current exercise schedule fails to support the readiness of the four JTF staffs predesignated in each theater. Consequently, the concept as currently formulated is untenable given the standards for organizational maturity necessary to successfully complete the mission.

Concept (3) Theater Staff Elements as the Nucleus of JTF Staffs.

This concept entails the use of the J-3, J-4 or J-5 from the Unified Commanders staff as the Commander, Joint Task Force and creation of a supportive staff using the same augmentation guidelines delineated in the Component Command option discussed above, except that the staff nucleus would be extracted from the Theater CINC's staff.. In this concept, the CJTF will provide the necessary regional focus to ensure appropriate consideration for host nation and alliance issues when planning and executing the JTF mission. In addition, the CINC's department head will certainly prove to be a subordinate Commander who enjoys the CINC's trust and confidence and, as such, will enjoy the freedom of action necessary to task organize the forces under his command. Further, the CJTF in this concept will provide a joint perspective in approaching the operational planning problem matched only by the provisions of the standing JTF concept. As such, the employment plans developed should accurately represent the goals established during the COA selection process (a process the CJTF will have participated in), and the joint capabilities provided by each of the Services represented in the theater of operations. The Commander provided by this concept should prove to be the most suitable for optimizing the concept of operations.

Unfortunately, there are also some serious disadvantages to the selection of a theater staff Department Head as CJTF. First, removing the J-3, J-4 or J-5 and a large portion of their department personnel from the theater staff will greatly undermine the ability of the CINC to support both the JTF and

other contingencies which may be transpiring in the region. Consequently, the very means for enabling the joint operation may be its major detractor over time.

A second disadvantage of using a theater staff Department Head as the CJTF will stem from the lack of a rank advantage over the subordinate forces assigned. While the Department Heads positional authority and sustained relevance as a principal regional actor in U. S. military affairs will largely negate this disadvantage, there may, nonetheless, be a deferential limit to his freedom of action in designating functional components and assigning tasks to Commanders of subordinate forces with peer rank. While this staffing concept was not specifically used during operations in Somalia, this peer perception problem surfaced during Operation Continue Hope as the CJTF was subordinate in rank to the subunified Commander collocated in Mogadishu (COMUSFORSOM) and only slightly senior to the Service Component representatives with local forces (TF Ranger and the NAVCENT Battle Groups). In part as a result of these concerns for interservice relations, the local forces were not assigned to the CJTF's operational control, remaining instead as "on order" forces though they were operating locally.¹⁷ In addition, no functional components were formed to tackle the many coordination issues which were undermining the ability of each component force to support its mission.

The JTF staff provided by the theater staff element will also enjoy the benefits of joint perspective and regional expertise discussed for the Commander. In addition, the staff element formed will provide these joint and regional perspectives to the overall JTF organization as augmentees joint the ranks. This provision will expedite the formation of a cohesive joint planning team, as well as easing inter-service rivalry. Besides this advantage, the staff formed using this concept will experience the same strengths and limitations espoused in the discussion of the Component Command staff concept. The burden of dual hatted administrative duties, the temptation to rotate staff officers during long term missions and an over reliance on liaison officers will all take their toll on the theater staff element. As such, this option is untenable for supporting a long term JTF mission, given the current provisions for JTF training and the limits imposed for personnel manning at the Theater and Component staffs.

Conclusions.

In the preceding pages, the relative advantages and disadvantages of three popular concepts for forming JTF staffs have been discussed. In each case, the flaws delineated constitute major impediments to successful completion of the JTF mission. In the case of the standing JTF staff concept, the fatal flaw is the lack of regional focus. In the case of the JTF staff formed by merging a staff nucleus from a Theater Component Command with a pre-established list of augmentees, the adverse factors included a lack of joint perspective, an inherent inability to form a cohesive planning team and an inability to sustain JTF missions not completed in the very short term. Finally, the JTF staff formed around a theater staff element was rejected because it will prohibitively degrade the CINC's ability to support the broader regional mission, as well as the JTF itself.

In my view, the optimal solution emerges when we combine elements of each of these three concepts. It is most important for the Commander to provide a regional focus and broad understanding of theater support issues. Consequently, the selection of a Theater Service Component Commander will best provide the level of leadership and expertise necessary. To ameliorate the impact upon the Component Commands ability to sustain its independent administrative duties and to extend the JTF's ability to support long term missions, the majority of the staff should come from a standing JTF staff element. Finally, to bridge the gap between the Commander and the standing JTF staff, a few select officers should be provided from the Commanders Component staff to provide personal representatives to oversee the Joint Intelligence Center formed, the watch teams provided, planning teams formed and the logistical and communications capabilities established. In cases where other theater specific information is necessary, a small number of personnel from the Theater and other Service Component staffs could be assigned as augmentees.

In this manner the following staff would be assembled:

- A three star JTF Commander from the Theater Component Command providing the preponderance of force.

- A junior flag officer (O-7) should be provided to command the standing JTF team when not deployed and to serve as the Deputy Commander when deployed.

- The National Intelligence Support Teams should be expanded and placed under the control of the standing JTF Commander. The NIST staff can then form the heart of the J-2 division when deployed. The J-2 will be augmented with personnel representing unique regional capabilities and to provide a liaison with the Theater staff.

- The JTF J-3 should include a Department Head and Watch Captains from the CJTF's Component staff to insure that the personnel manning the watch stations and planning teams pass orders consistent with the Commanders philosophy of command. The remainder of the J-3 should be provided by the standing JTF staff, including planners and watchstanders. The standing JTF planning group should be formed with complete joint representation. These personnel should be schooled in Operational Art and Campaign planning procedures, as well as maintaining a robust liaison with the JCS J-3 personnel conducting COA reviews during Crisis Action Planning.

- The logistical staff should be composed of personnel from the Theater Commanders J-4 staff. Augmentation from the Theater Service Components and from TRANSCOM will roundout the staff to form an effective logistical management team and the JOPES operators necessary to maintain current plans.¹⁸

- The JCSE should be expanded to form the nucleus of the JTF J-6 division. A representative from the CJTF's Component staff could coordinate any unique communications requirements with this staff core.

This composite staff concept will provide a regional focus at the highest level of the staffs organization, planning teams thoroughly schooled in joint capabilities, standardization in the fields of intelligence and communications support and most importantly, staff continuity and organizational maturity throughout the operational timeline (from COA selection and JTF deployment through execution and mission completion), without undue reliance on unrealistic training requirements or dual tasked staff officers. In this concept, a minimum of 70% of the staff personnel would be provided by a standing JTF

staff, thereby insuring that watch team and planning team integration, as well as inter-departmental communications remain robust despite the addition of augmentees in some of the areas most dependent on regional expertise. Further, with select augmentation by the CJTF's Component staff, sufficient checks and balances are provided to insure that the Commanders philosophy and concerns are properly portrayed to subordinate forces, as well as allied and host nation personnel.

Without a doubt, the future will provide us with many opportunities to build Joint Task Forces to meet regional objectives. Whether future operations feature humanitarian aid or Major Regional Conflicts, the necessity for unity of command, unity of effort, economy of force, clearly defined objectives, mass and simplicity will be as crucial tomorrow as they have been in the past. This paper has provided a review of three concepts for organizing command elements to meet tomorrow's challenges, with the intent of focusing on each organizational constructs impact on adherence to the principles of war and tenets of organizational efficiency. As a result, fatal flaws have been cited with each of the constructs we have discussed. In the end, it is only by taking the best elements of each concept that we can provide the regionally tailored staff required to meet the joint missions objectives. Armed with this composite staff, future JTF's can deploy, fight and win our future conflicts.

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